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2. The logical Mechanisms of Life
“The designs found in nature are nothing short of brilliant, but the process of design that generates them is utterly
lacking in intelligence of its own”.  Daniel Dennett, NY Times 2005
Life-As-It-Could-Be: but, what is non-life-as-it-could-be?
“Artificial Life [AL] is the study of man-made systems that exhibit behaviors characteristic of natural living systems.
It complements the traditional biological sciences concerned with the analysis of living organisms by attempting
to synthesize life-like behaviors within computers and other artificial media. By extending the empirical foundation
upon which biology is based beyond the carbon-chain life that has evolved on Earth, Artificial Life can contribute
to theoretical biology by locating life-as-we-know-it within the larger picture of life-as-it-could-be. [...] [AL] views
life as a property of the organization of matter, rather than a property of the matter which is so organized. Whereas
biology has largely concerned itself with the material basis of life, Artificial Life is concerned with the formal basis
of life. [... It] starts at the bottom, viewing an organism as a large population of simple machines, and works upwards
synthetically from there — constructing large aggregates of simple, rule-governed objects which interact with one
another nonlinearly in the support of life-like, global dynamics. The ‘key’ concept in AL is emergent behavior.”
[Langton, 1989, pp 1-2] 
 
“Artificial Life is concerned with tuning the behaviors of such low-level machines that the behavior that emerges
at the global level is essentially the same as some behavior exhibited by a natural living system. [...] Artificial Life
is concerned with generating lifelike behavior.”  [Langton, 1989, pp 4 and 5] 
The previous quotes indicate the goals of Artificial Life according to Chris Langton: the search for complex,
artificial, systems which instantiate some kind of lifelike organization. There seems to be both a desire to
obtain an actual artificial living organization, as well as obtaining some lifelike behavior. The first goal is
more ambitious and related to the first definition of life introduced in lecture one, while the second goal is
related to the second definition.  The methodology to reach either of these goals is also in line with the notion
of emergence mentioned in lecture one: from the non-linear interaction of simple, mechanistic, components,
we wish to observe the emergence of complicated, life-like, unpredictable, behavior. Natural living organisms
are likewise composed of non-living components. As pointed out in lecture one, the origin problem in biology
is precisely the emergence of life from non-living components. The material components follow, and are
completely described, by physical laws, however, a mechanical explanation of the overall living system is
incomplete. Similarly, in Artificial Life, we have formal components obeying a particular set of axioms, and
from their interaction, global behavior emerges which is not completely explained by the local formal rules.
Clearly, the formal rules play the role of an artificial matter and the global behavior, if recognized as life-like,
plays the role of an artificial biology.
“Of course, the principle assumption made in Artificial Life is that the ‘logical form’ of an organism can be
separated from its material basis of construction, and that ‘aliveness’ will be found to be a property of the former,
not of the latter.” [Langton, 1989, page 11]
The idea is that if we are able to find the basic design principles of living organization, then the material
substrate used to realize life is irrelevant. By investigating these basic principles we start studying not only
biological, carbon-based, life — life-as-we-know-it — but really the universal rules of life, or life-as-it-could-
be.  Moreover, from a better understanding of the design principles of life, we can use them to solve
engineering problems similar to those that living organisms face [Segel and Cohen, 2001; DeCastro and Von
Zuben, 2005]. Several problems have been raised regarding this separation of matter from form, or the search
5for a universality without matter [Cariani, 1992; Moreno et al, 1994], which will not be discussed here. What
needs to be made more explicit is the relationship between the two distinct goals of AL. 
Looking at emergent behavior, obtained from formal complex systems, in search of interesting behavior leads
to a certain circularity. If AL is concerned with finding life-like behavior in artificial, universal, systems,  we
are ultimately binding life-as-could-be to the behavior of life-as-we-know-it by virtue of some subjective
resemblance. This can hardly be accepted as the search for universal principles.
“They say, ‘Look, isn’t this reminiscent of a biological or a physical phenomenon!’ They jump in right away as if
it’s a decent model for the phenomenon, and usually of course it’s just got some accidental features that make it look
like something.” [Jack Cowan as quoted in Scientific American, June 1995 issue, “From Complexity to Perplexity”,
by J. Horgan, page 104]
 
“Artificial Life — and the entire field of complexity—seems to be based on a seductive syllogism: There are simple
sets of mathematical rules that when followed by a computer give rise to extremely complicated patterns. The world
also contains many extremely complicated patterns. Conclusion: Simple rules underlie many extremely complicated
phenomena in the world. With the help of powerful computers, scientists can root those rules out.” [J. Horgan, 
Scientific American, June 1995 issue, “From Complexity to Perplexity”, page 107]
 
“Artificial Life is basically a fact-free science”. [John Maynard Smith as quoted in Scientific American, June 1995
issue, “From Complexity to Perplexity”, by J. Horgan, page 107]
The problem is that Artificial Life must be compared to something, otherwise it becomes a factless
manipulation of computer rules with subjective resemblances to real life. Again, we are faced with many
possible types of emergent complex behaviors, this time formal, but what kinds of these behaviors can be
classified as “life-as-could-be”? What is the formal threshold of complexity needed? In the natural world we
are able to distinguish life from non-life, biology from physics due to the known signatures of bio-chemistry.
In the logical realm, we likewise need a formal criteria to distinguish logical life from logical non-life,
artificial life from artificial physics.
“Artificial Life must be compared with a real or an artificial nonliving world. Life in an artificial world requires
exploring what we mean by an alternative physical or mathematical reality.” [Pattee, 1995]
The two goals of AL are usually described as hard and soft AL respectively. The first concerns the synthesis
of artificial life from computational or material (e.g. embodied robotics) components. The second is interested
in producing life-like behavior and is essentially metaphorical. To be accepted as a scientific field, Alife
cannot settle for  subjective rules of what constitutes living behavior. Indeed, whether we want to synthesize
life or merely simulate a particular behavior of living organisms, we need investigate the rules that allow us
to distinguish life from non-life . Only by establishing an artificial physics, from which an artificial biology
can emerge, and a theory, or set of rules, distinguishing the two, can we aim at a proper science based on fact.
In other words, the methodology of Artificial Life requires existing theories of life to be compared against;
it can also contribute to the meta-methodology of Biology by allowing us to test and improve its theories
beyond the unavoidable material constraints, such as the incomplete fossil record or measurement of cellular
activity. Naturally, the requirements for hard AL are much stricter, as we are not merely interested in
behaviors that can be compared to real biological systems with looser or stricter rules, but the actual
realization of an artificial organization that must be agreed to be living against some theory. Soft AL, may
restrict itself to particular behavioral traits which need only to be simulated to a satisfactory degree.
6Simulations, Realizations, Systemhood, Thinghood, and Theories of Life
“Boids are not birds; they are not even remotely like birds; they have no cohesive physical structure, but rather exist
as information structures — processes — within a computer. But — and this is the critical ‘but’— at the level of
behaviors, flocking Boids and flocking birds are two instances of the same phenomenon: flocking. [...] The
‘artificial’ in Artificial Life refers to the component parts, not the emergent processes. If the component parts are
implemented correctly, the processes they support are genuine — every bit as genuine as the natural processes they
imitate. [...] Artificial Life will therefore be genuine life —it will simply be made of different stuff than the life that
has evolved on Earth.” [Langton, 1989, pp. 32-33]
“Simulations and realizations belong to different categories of modeling. Simulations are metaphorical models that
symbolically ‘stand for’ something else. Realizations are literal, material models that implement functions.
Therefore, accuracy in a simulation need have no relation to quality of function in a realization. Secondly, the
criteria for good simulations and realizations of a system depend on our theory of the system. The criteria for good
theories depend on more than mimicry, e.g., Turing Tests.” [Pattee, 1989, page 63]
As Pattee points out, the bottom line is that a simulation, no matter how good it is, is not a realization.
Nonetheless, it may still be possible to obtain artificial living organisms (realizations) if, from an artificial
environment, we are able to generate, in a bottom-up manner, organizations which conform to some theory
of life we wish to test. Howard Pattee [1989] has proposed that if emergent artificial organisms are able to
perform measurements, or in other words, categorize their (artificial) environment, then they may be
considered realizations. Some claim that computational environments do not allow for this creative form of
emergence [see Cariani, 1992; Moreno, et all, 1994]. In any case, whatever artificial environment we may
use, computational or material, we need a theory allowing us to distinguish life from non-life.
Related to this issue, and in the context of complex systems science, is the search of those properties of the
world which can be abstracted from their specific material substrate: systemhood from thinghood. Systems
science is concerned with the study of systemhood properties, but there may be systems from which
systemhood cannot be completely abstracted from thinghood. Life is sometimes proposed as one of those
systems [see Rosen, 1986, 1991; Moreno et al, 1994; Pattee, 1995]. The difficulty for systems science, or
complexity theory, lies precisely in the choice of the appropriate level of abstraction. If we abstract enough,
most things will look alike, leading to a theory of factless, reminiscent analogies, exposed by Cowan and
Maynard-Smith above. If, on the other hand,  we abstract too little, all fields of inquiry tend to fall into
increasingly specific niches, accumulating much data and knowledge about (context-specific) components
without much understanding of, or ability to control, the (general) macro-level organization. In the context
of life, we do not want to be tied uniquely to carbon-based life, or life-as-we-know-it, but we also do not want
life-as-could-be to be anything at all. The challenge lies precisely on finding the right amounts of systemhood
and thinghood, as well as the interactions between the two, necessary for a good theory of life, real or
artificial.
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